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This thesis seeks to explore the satisfaction levels for variables that 
should be considered when procuring equipment in the BDF.  It is believed that 
this investigation should lead to a statistical model specific to the BDF’s 
procurement methods.  New methods of acquisition are now demanded by the 
PPADB; hence new metrics have to be applied to strike an accord with the new 
requirements of buying for government.  The null hypothesis, Ho, for this thesis is 
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independent variables.  This follows from the preliminary conclusion that there is 
substantial downtime as at present.  It postulates that something can be done to 
ameliorate past mishaps. The null hypothesis therefore assumes that this will 
continue to prevail no matter what is done.  The alternative hypothesis, Ha, is 
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The views expressed in this thesis are entirely those of the author, and do 
not reflect on the official position of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) or that of 
the Botswana government. The thesis adds to the continuing scholarly debates 
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This thesis seeks to explore the satisfaction levels for variables that 
should be considered when procuring equipment in the BDF.  This exploration 
should lead to a statistical model specific to the BDF’s procurement methods. It 
will also reveal independence of evaluation from the respondents.  The model 
and other results should give forward impetus to the design of professional 
procurement practices.  It is also expected that encourage a new look towards 
the reduction of downtime. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Botswana Defence Force was formed by an Act of Parliament on 
April, 15, 19771.  Before the formation of the BDF, Botswana depended on the 
Botswana Border Police (BBP) – a paramilitary police force.   BBP later became 
Police Mobile Unit (PMU) to attend to boundary and border patrols. As recorded 
by Gaborone (1994), members of PMU constituted the formative structures of the 
BDF, before new recruitment could be done to fill the initial manpower 
requirement2.  This was formed out of bare essentials because PMU was just a 
paramilitary organization that did not have the requisite personnel and equipment 
to be a fully fledged army.    
Procurement of equipment and training were therefore going to make a 
good portion of the BDF budget during its toddler stages.  In the midst of the 
turbulence of the early growth years, clearly outlined by Gaborone3, it was 
difficult to have the requisite defense equipment all at once.  Consequently there 
were donations from several countries to increase the little inventory that the 
BDF could put together within its small budget.   
                                            
1 The Botswana Defence Force Act Chapter 21:05 section 4. 
2 Mabe R Gaborone. 1994. “The Search for Peace and Security: The Case of Botswana” – a 
thesis for the Master of Science in International Resource Planning and Management at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Pages 9 – 13. 
3 Ibid, footnote 2. 
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The first thorny issue with the early procurement methods led to infiltration 
of the wide variety of equipment in inventory.  This equipment was different in 
technology whose design followed different military doctrines, hence training 
requirements.  This puts a premium on both training and after sales support.  The 
BDF’s acquisition methods also did not help the situation, seeing by the 
continued maintenance requirement of the varied equipment base.  For instance 
continuing to maintain different types of personal rifles is a prime example of the 
maintenance of variety.  Assuming exponential distribution of failure times, as 
may be the case of unpredicted failures, the mean time between failures (MTBF), 
is reduced by the equipment in deployment introducing a small MTBF4. 
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system will perform 
satisfactorily during a given time frame under specified operating conditions.  
This gets reduced when the variety increases.  The amount of spares required, 
also increases with the variety of equipment to be repaired or maintained, in 
order to keep a certain level of operational availability (Ao)5.  This obviously 
translates into higher operational costs the more varied the equipment and by 
extension increased downtime for lack of funds.  Operational availability is 
defined as the probability that equipment when used under stated conditions, in 
an actual operational environment will operate satisfactorily when called upon6.   
Training costs also go high as each supplier may have to train operators 
and technicians to use their equipment.  This means an increase in the total cost 
of ownership (TCO)7.  The individual supplier charges the buyer (BDF) the 
market rate and due to variety there is no bargaining power that accrues to the 
BDF.  The BDF in a desperate endeavor to keep all its equipment operational is 
compelled to pay the exorbitant training and maintenance costs where 
sometimes a manufacturer’s engineer is called into the country to ‘advise’ the 
                                            
4 Benjamin S Blanchard. 2004. Logistics Engineering and Management. 6th edition, page 47. 
5 Ibid, footnote 4. 
6 Ibid, footnote 4 
7 See Burt et al. 2003. WSCMSM: The Key to Supply Chain Management. McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
7th edition, pages 341 – 342. 
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technicians and engineers8.  (NB: Most of the equipment is purchased from 
outside the country).   
The difficulty with military equipment is that it is normally not commercial 
off the shelf (COTS), so the argument for a varied supply base falls apart. 
Although there has been a requirement in the US defense procurement, to use 
COTS in defense equipment to lower initial costs, there are added costs later.  
Any change of a COTS item by the manufacturer results in additional costs for 
the buyer in reverse engineering9, if say the particular equipment is no longer 
produced.   
Nonetheless, the case for fewer suppliers is shaken only when 
considering equipment that has been licensed, for manufacturing, to several 
suppliers.  In that case the different licensees could offer different prices 
according to their different production overheads.  This is a case when market 
forces begin to dictate terms according to the law of supply and demand.    
The second issue of concern is the lack of what McCaffery and Jones 
(2004) call Total Obligation Authority (TOA)10.  Also the lack of Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) explained by the same 
authors incapacitates proper equipping of the BDF.  This is all the appropriations 
available from prior years including the current one to be used on programs.  The 
BDF is treated just like all government departments in the civil service, where 
appropriations must be spent in one financial year and the remainder, whether 
obligated/committed or not, will revert back to government coffers.  This means 
there is pressure to exhaust the year’s funds each year to avoid Parliamentary 
punishment of a lower appropriation the following year.  The Constitution of 
Botswana at section 118(1) demands that the withdrawal of funds from the 
                                            
8 See Burt et al. 2003. WSCMSM: The Key to Supply Chain Management. McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
7th edition, pages 341 – 342. 
9 Alford, Lt Col Lionel D. Jr. “Problems with Aviation COTS”. Acquisition Review Journal. 
Summer 1999. 
 
10 See Jerry L McCaffery and L R Jones. 2004. Budgeting and Financial Management for 
National Defense: A volume in research in public management. Information Age Publishing. page 
370. 
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Consolidated Fund (i.e., government revenues not appropriated for anything), 
should be done by authority of an Appropriation Act of parliament11.  This 
appropriation is done every year for each financial year according to the Finance 
and Audit Act of Botswana, implemented by the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning (MFDP), at sections 14 and 1512.  The constraints this 
puts on thorough equipment testing/trials and evaluation are not without an 
adverse impact on planning.  Further this means it is the responsibility of the BDF 
Commander (CDF) to bring the budget that includes the running program with 
the government budget each year.  Parliament has never given in to a multiyear 
appropriation.  This thesis intends to argue for more time and liberty for the CDF 
in order to analyze thoroughly the proposed equipment, without being concerned 
about whether the funds will be available to fund the project.  The difficulty of the 
single year appropriation naturally leads to funds being transferred between 
programs to the detriment of the whole operational readiness of the BDF. 
The Botswana financial year runs from April 1 of each year to March 31 of 
the following year.  The Accountant General at MFDP requires that all payments 
should be done by the end of March each year.  If the BDF returns a substantial 
portion of the financial year allocation then the next allocation will be less.  This 
creates a lot of pressure to use funds.  The rush leads to expenditure done for 
the sake of it sometimes.  All funds released each year are closely related to the 
budgets that BDF would have submitted in July of the past year.  The situation as 
it applies presupposes that all government procurement agencies should work 
within these time constraints to get the best equipment into their inventories.  
This is not always possible due to the long delivery lead times of military 
equipment.  The issues surrounding this anomaly will be addressed in this thesis. 
The third issue is the apparent irrelevance of the Defence Council.  Kenosi 
(2003)13 said that, “In a democracy, civilian control of the armed forces is a 
                                            
11 Constitution of Botswana, commenced on 30th September 1966. 
12 Finance and Audit Act, commenced on 23rd January, 1970 
13 Kenosi, Lekoko. 2003. “The Botswana Defence Force and Public Trust: The Military 
Dilemma in a Democracy”. www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Kenosi.pdf. (Accessed 
1/30/2004). 
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matter of paramount importance.” This is a true statement and this thesis agrees 
with that.  This is the duty that can be done by the Defence Council in Botswana.  
The BDF Act provides for the establishment of the council as appointed from time 
to time by the President of Botswana “…for the control, direction and general 
superintendence of the Defence Force”14.  Hitherto the appointments had been 
confined to parliamentarians, which should be a good thing for purposes of 
proper representation before the legislature, who are the holders of the purse 
strings.  This thesis intends to argue that the legislative provision for the Defence 
Council is vague at best.  It further requires more executive responsibility for the 
Defence Council.  For purposes of civilian control, critical for conventional forces, 
it has to be clear what the council can do to help the BDF in the appropriations 
and running programs.  Unfortunately when it comes to the budget and its 
defense the CDF is alone and the council only scarcely makes an appearance. 
This is a weakening process, because the CDF being a civil servant cannot 
naturally handle the resistance of political forces in parliament when he is outside 
the fold.  The Defence Council should stand in the gap and advance support for 
programs and not the CDF who should be a user or procurement customer. 
Further to the above there is responsibility to the Ministry of Presidential 
Affairs and Public Administration (PAPA).  This Ministry as it relates to the BDF is 
like a Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Department of Defense (DoD).  A part of this 
Ministry is referred to as the Office of the President (OP) and is headed at an 
administrative level by the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP).  Budgets 
that exceed BWP 100 million must be approved there by the PSP.  It is the duty 
of the CDF to take his budget to the PSP for approval. (NB:In other Ministries this 
is done by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry).   
Once approved, by the PSP, the budget is then sent to the MFDP for 
appropriations, which depend on funds availability.  This process is made long for 
the BDF, by the absence of administrative staff of a fully fledged MoD/DoD.  The 
Ministry of PAPA has other responsibilities other than defense that they deal 
                                            
14 BDF Act section 8(2), op. cit. page 1.  
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with.  This is a further complication in the procurement processes of the BDF.  It 
shall be addressed in this thesis. 
Prior to June 20, 2002 when the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal 
Board (PPADB) was commissioned, all government tendering went through a 
government agency in MFDP called Central Tender Board (CTB).  This was an 
operational unit of MFDP.  PPADB was formed in response to a public outcry that 
tendering was not “transparent, accountable and fair”15.  The main issue of 
contention with the former tendering process was that the civil service that ran 
the CTB did not have enough appreciation of the needs of free market 
competition.   Further they were too busy with other responsibilities in their core 
jobs to be able to devote a lot of time to tendering.  The BDF had to go through 
the CTB as much as it was a government entity.   
Gideon Nkala said the following about the CTB process:  
There are countless systems and procedures within the 
government tender process, and cumulatively these result in the 
area being something of a closed book, closely guarded from public 
scrutiny16.   
Nkala had referred extensively to a report compiled by the Directorate of 
Corruption Economic Crime (DCEC), Botswana Confederation of Commerce, 
Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), and Commonwealth Business Council 
(CBC).  The report had concluded that government tendering was “run by cartels” 
and that “privileged information” may have been “passed on”, so to speak.  He 
further gave the landmark case of The State vs Kebonyekgotla Kemokgatla who 
was bribed to give priority to a road construction, as just a tip of the iceberg.  
Kemokgatla was finally charged with corruption and sentenced to a prison term.  
When there are no checks and balances there is bound to be abuse of inside 
                                            
15 PPADB background information, 2003. 
16  Gideon Nkala, 2003, at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No89/Chap2.htm. 
(Accessed 10/30/2004).  Penetrating State and Business Organised Crime in Southern 
Africa. Volume Two Edited by Peter Gastrow.  
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information.  The BDF performed acquisition responsibilities during the CTB 
regime, just like many other government agencies.   
Mpho Molomo writing in 2000 agreed with Kenneth Good that: 
…procurement of arms and operations of the BDF are surrounded 
with a cloak of secrecy to the extent of denying such information to 
members of parliament17.    
Kenneth Good in 1996 had disagreed with the then Minister of PAPA, 
Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe.  The Minister had argued that it is 
abnormal for countries to make defense expenditure revelations to the public.   
It is outside the scope of this thesis to prove or disprove corruption in 
defense acquisition. The thesis nonetheless argues that the system of the CTB 
hampered proper equipping of the BDF.  Proper accounting, supplier selection 
and transparent procedures of evaluation could not have been followed in such 
an unhealthy scenario.  Further to that equipment in inventory is consuming 
substantial amounts in operations and maintenance money.  The operational 
availability (Ao), of the inventory in the armories is considered very unsatisfactory.   
The formation of PPADB18 further establishes the fact of the creeping 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the former system.  PPADB came as good 
news to the business community but like all changes there are teething 
problems.  The BDF found itself having to use new methods of source selection 
that ushered in the needed transparency, fairness, equity, etc., and this led to 
longer source selection times.  It became clear that acquisition needed enhanced 
expertise.  This was underlined by the amounts of returned funds during the first 
year of PPADB’s life.  The CTB regime did not demand professionalism, because 
the acquisition personnel were just carrying out orders. Perhaps agreeing with 
Nkala (2003)19, the BDF of the day with a good share of its budget going to 
defense acquisition, was a cash cow to a few beneficiaries.  This thesis argues 
                                            
17 See Molomo, M.G., 2001. "Civil-Military Relations in Botswana's Developmental State." African 
Studies Quarterly 5(2): 3. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i12a3.htm (Accessed on 
10/30/2004) 
18 See Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board Act of 2001.  Botswana Laws. 
19 Ibid, footnote 15. 
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for a professional acquisition work force, which transcends the mere perception 
of the BDF as a money machine.  It is the duty of the government to equip the 
army for a combat role and with equipment that will provide years of good 
service.  Botswana’s Vision 2016 also puts a further premium on acquisition 
procedures when it concludes that “there must be clear benchmarks for military 
expenditure, so that the burden on the economy can be controlled”20.  
There is a department of the BDF that deals with equipment acquisition.  It 
is called the Directorate of Material Acquisition and Planning (DMAP).  The 
directorate is responsible for the procurement of all equipment in the BDF.  It is 
effectively an implementer of the decisions of the BDF command.  There are no 
rules like the USA’s Federal Acquisition Regulations that allows the director 
some level of independent decision making.  Contract management after the 
orders are made is also subject to prior approval of command when modifications 
are to be made.  It used to be headed at the rank of Major and from 2003 it was 
upgraded to be headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. At the time of writing the 
headship was upgraded to a Colonel’s rank.  But even then the route to decision 
making is still long.  Suggestions currently go from a staff officer in the 
directorate, through the director; the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics 
(DACOSL), a Colonel; the ACOSL - a Brigadier and ends up with the Deputy 
Chief of Staff Defence Logistics Command (DCOS DLC) - a Major General.  The 
office of the DCOS DLC is where the acquisition decision making is done.  This is 
a centralized system.  It is in accord with current WSCMsm suggested by Burt et 
al. (2003)21.   However the DCOS DLC also deals with logistics issues and not 
just acquisition.   In order for organizations to maximize on the value of the 
supply chain the supply/purchasing manager must be senior enough to make 
decisions fast.  The limp of the BDF process is the two extra positions in the 
reporting chain of command.  The best option for now would have been for the 
directorate to report directly to the DCOS DLC to shorten the time to reach a 
                                            
20 See Vision 2016: Towards prosperity for all. 1997. Compiled by the Presidential Task 
Group for a Long Term Vision for Botswana. 
21 Ibid. footnote 7. 
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decision.  At the rank of Colonel the director is senior enough to report to the 
DCOS DLC.  Long reporting chains have the propensity to loose important 
details on the way.  This can be avoided by providing for a high value of the 
supply manager.  Adding to the handicap is the sparse staffing of the directorate.  
There are currently four staff officers who do not have specialized staff under 
them.  The staff officers are the ones doing the clerical work as well as 
participating in the source selection processes.  This thesis is in favor of a fully 
staffed directorate for purposes of efficiency:  in fact there should be a position of 
Major General heading acquisition to separate this from logistics.   
Perhaps it would also suffice to make a note of the expenditures on 
defense in Botswana.  Unlike the unresearched criticisms of some voices 
hitherto, Botswana has a normal defense expenditure trend.  It has to be noted 
that the figures that are published are inclusive of the budgets for personnel; 
operations and maintenance; military housing; procurement and other 
necessities.  The BDF does not do research and development like some armies 
do, hence the controllable levels of expenditures.  The following table, maps out 
this information from 1993/94 financial years to 2003/04. 
Table 1. Defense Expenditure as a percentage of GDP  
Financial Year in millions of Pula (BWP) 
Item 
93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00* 00/01* 01/02* 
02/03* 
 03/04* 
GDPa 1,115 2,530 4,631 8,015 20,438 23,259 25,363 29,353 34,049 39,497 45,817 
DEb 45 53 91 45 639 869 938 975 1,182 1,411 1,500 
GDP .01 .61 .36 .47 3.12 3.74 3.70 3.32 3.47 3.57 3.27 
a Gross Domestic Product in purchases value 
b Defense expenditure 
* The GDP figures were increased at a nominal rate of 16% which consisted of approximately 10% real growth and 6% 
inflation.   
Sources:  Bank of Botswana; Central Statistics Office; Africa South of the Sahara (Regional Surveys of the World and 
Janes Information Group). 
Compared with South Africa the budget is higher as a percentage of GDP.  
It is clear from the table above that defense expenditure in Botswana hovers 
around 3-4% of GDP. Janes Information Group reports that the South African 
defense expenditure will go down to 1.47% of the national budget at the end of 
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2006/0722.  This current year (year of writing) saw the South African government 
allocating ZAR 20.3 billion (USD 2.9 million).   In money terms this is higher than 
the Botswana budget which stands at around USD 0.3 billion (2003/04 figures).   
While there was higher defense expenditure during World War II and the 
cold war the United States expenditure on defense is around the same figures of 
3-4% at peace time according to McCaffery and Jones, op. cit. page 1 at page 
85.  This and the above comparison are done here to show that the trend in 
Botswana is typical in peace time.   
As mentioned above Botswana built the army from a police unit which did 
not have defense equipment.  The Botswana government was initially not 
enthusiastic about military procurement, until the South African incursions of the 
1980s.  This led the government to reconsider.  Gaborone (1994):op. cit., records 
this growth at page 54 of his thesis23.  The point here is that there was 
insignificant operational availability of equipment in the BDF for a long time and it 
is being built now.  The question is: Are the processes of procurement assisting 
to develop the necessary capability?  An attempt to furnish answers will be done 
by this thesis. 
C. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Due to the recent formation of the DCOS DLC in the BDF, the bar has 
been raised for better performance of the acquisition function.  The old methods 
inducted poor-performing inventory which has to be rectified. New methods of 
acquisition are now demanded by the PPADB as well; hence new metrics have 
to be applied to strike an accord with the new requirements of buying for 
government.  Further to all this, there has been no published research on 
                                            









23 Ibid, Gaborone, page 1. 
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acquisition in the BDF.  Conducting this research will lead to a model and hence 
a starting point for later use by the authorities.    
There are new processes suggested for the BDF like TOA.  This will give 
the acquisition workforce more analysis time in the selection of suppliers.  To 
ensure that government does not continuously circle around one project for a 
long time, there is a need for long term planning.  When this is done it demands 
that appropriations for the life of programs will be done at the initial stage.  This 
will bind parliament to the program for the period projected.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Exploratory Research 
This thesis draws from the relevant published literature on the subject of 
defense specific to Botswana and in some countries around the world for 
exploratory studies.  Studying other countries’ methods, cannot be sufficient as a 
readymade solution because each country is controlled by different laws, rules 
and regulations.  The main value of the exploration is to reveal the acquisition 
theories and methods of the defense acquisition world.  Congressman Mavroules 
(1991) had emphasized that it is not a feasible exercise to copy a foreign system 
to solve a domestic problem.  However, he underlines the importance of learning 
and perhaps adapting some foreign methods24.  This thesis does not replace 
empirical research with this exploration.  In the words of Cooper and Schindler 
(2003) exploratory research helps to,  
…expand your understanding of the management dilemma… and 
…look for ways others have …solved problems similar to your 
management dilemma25.   
The advice offered by the quotation above is followed here.   
2. Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis, Ho, for this thesis is that:  Downtime or turnaround 
time (TAT) cannot be reduced by favorable independent variables.  This follows 
                                            
24 Congressman Mavroules, 1991 in “Creating a Professional Acquisition Workforce” in 
National Contract Management Journal. 
25 From Cooper and Schindler, 2003, in Business Research Methods, 8th edition, at page 
281. 
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from the preliminary conclusion that there is substantial downtime as at present.  
It postulates that something can be done to ameliorate past mishaps. The null 
hypothesis therefore assumes that this will continue to prevail no matter what is 
done.  The alternative hypothesis, Ha, is that:  TAT can be reduced by favorable 
independent variables.  A five percent level of significance on a two tailed test 
basis, i.e. α = .025 was used. This starts from a founding premise that several 
variables cause or prevent down time.  This is a causal study where the 
dependent variable (DV) is TAT.  The research question to be answered is: Are 
there procurement processes which would lead to better equipment 
performance?  The thesis employs multivariate analysis where the following 
variables will be the independent variables (IVs) and will be used to infer 
causation: 
• Time given to trials and evaluation before purchase decision is made (a).   
• Deliveries lead times (b).   
• Equipment variety (c).   
• Inventory management (d).   
• Quality of acquisition personnel (e).   
• Supplier preference (f).   
• Duration of supply contract (g).   
• Reliability, Operational Availability and Maintainability (h).   
• Relations with PPADB (i).   
3. Sample Design 
The sample here is the officers of the BDF from the ranks of Second 
Lieutenant and above.  The officer ranks are used because they are privy to 
more information than their juniors in the other ranks.  The use of the officer 
corps is consistent with the use of a sample frame26 from where structured 
answers could be collected27.  
 
                                            
26 See Benjamin S. Blanchard. 2004. Logistics Engineering and Management. Sixth Edition.  
Pearson Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. Page 188. 
27 Ibid, footnote 26.  Page 362. 
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4. Questionnaire Design 
The thesis measures the satisfaction of stakeholders and utility of 
equipment in the BDF as well as generates a regression formula for later use.  
The questionnaire was designed using a Likert Scale28 so that the nominal data 
from the answers could be converted into interval data for analysis purposes.  A 
Likert scale measure is a summated scale that measures how favorable or 
unfavorable a subject of interest is. There were four groups of respondents who 
would be revealed, i.e. user, maintenance personnel, acquisition personnel or 
Command (Commanding Officer and above).  A Chi-squared test, X2, was then 
used to test for normality.  This was a non-parametric test.  A multivariate 
regression analysis was also carried out by ignoring the segmentation brought by 
the last question of declaring one’s position.  This introduces an intrinsic ability to 
manipulate variables accordingly in the future to maximize benefits from 
acquisition.  Acceptable downtime or turnaround time was set at ten days.  The 
reason for the use of these tests was that the thesis intended to encourage 
operational availability within the constraints of scarce and bare essentials.  
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II. EXPLORATORY STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO BDF ACQUISITION METHODS 
In September 2003, Major General (MG) J.G. Tlhokwane29, as the Deputy 
Chief of Staff Defence Logistics Command (DCOS DLC) promulgated what he 
termed “Tendering Guidelines for the Procuring Entities in the BDF”.  He did this 
in order to “ensure that high standards of professionalism, transparency and 
accountability are maintained”.  In his view the several directives issued in the 
past did not help the BDF’s course because it continued with “inconsistent 
procurement practices…” that in his view, “…did not augur well for the promotion 
of efficiency, effectiveness, ethical and transparent procurement activities”.  This 
expression of disenchantment joined the chorus of intellectuals and journalists 
writing from outside the BDF like Molomo, Nkala, Good and others already 
referenced in Chapter I above.    
MG Tlhokwane further argues for a well trained acquisition and 
procurement workforce.  It shall become clear in the pages that follow that this is 
a long way from being achieved.  In another unpublished internal document the 
CDF, just after he took over command of the defense force said: 
…taking the BDF into the 21st century requires a dedicated, 
adequately trained… officer corps which is confident in its ability to 
command and lead30.   
The training of the acquisition workforce is currently not sufficient to say 
the least.  The majority of the people that are still manning key acquisition 
positions have not recently had any new training and few new officers are getting 
any acquisition specialized training.  How and when an aggressive and deliberate 
training of the workforce will be done to meet the demands of the 21st century is 
still course for conjecture.  Most officers do not have even Diploma/Associate 
degree in acquisition/procurement courses.  They progressed to higher ranks of 
                                            
29 This was an unpublished internal paper entitled “Tendering Guidelines for the Procuring 
Entities in the BDF”.   
30 “Journey into the Future” by Commander, BDF.  1998.  Unpublished. 
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the procurement workforce through longevity.  If they were included in the 
acquisition workforce through some sort of professional merit, then this author 
begs to differ.  There is currently a structure for the logistics command that 
encompasses the Directorate of Material Acquisition and Planning (DMAP).  The 
figure that follows summarizes the logistics command structure that was 




Figure 1. Logistics Command Units of the BDF and their Chain of Command 
 
The next figure shows the BDF headquarters component of the BDF 
DCOS DLC, which performs mainly staff work.  This is headed by a Brigadier 
who is the Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics (ACOSL).  However he still reports to 
the logistics commander – the DCOS DLC.  The structure in Figure 2 reveals 
that, decisions for acquisition have a long internal bureaucracy.   The staff 
officers in DMAP report to their director, who then reports to the DACOSL.  The 
DACOSL takes the matter up with ACOSL and finally a procurement decision is 
done by the DCOS DLC.  This is required even if it had been approved before 
hand, that the program concerned should be included in the budget.   
Currently there is a lot of micromanagement in BDF acquisition.  This is 
because there are no clear rules of procedure and instruments for correction. In 































the absence of these rules of procedure it will be difficult to apply punitive 
measures for deviant practices.  The only solution seems to be the use of 





Figure 2. Logistics Branch Structure at BDF HQ 
 
There are ways in which the BDF does its procurement.  The PPADB Act 
which was referenced in Chapter I sets out standards for all government 
departments and the BDF designed its methods closely following those generally 
required by the PPADB Act of 2001.  MG Tlhokwane outlined five procurement 
procedures in his paper and these are treated in turn below31. 
1. Public/Formal Tender  
This is the kind of tendering where there is prior advertisement in the 
Botswana Government Gazette or other publicly accessible media, either locally 
                                            
31 This was an unpublished internal paper entitled “Tendering Guidelines for the Procuring 




























Source:  Anonymous. Logistics Branch BDF HQ. Unpublished Internal Paper 
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or internationally.  It is the most preferred method and is demanded where the 
value exceeds BWP 100,000 (approximately USD 20,000).  This brings the 
advantage that only the lowest bidder who is both responsible and responsive 
will win the tender. This is similar to what Burt, et al.32 refer to as Competitive 
Sealed Bidding which requires that: 
• All capable firms should be invited in the case of government business - 
only selected ones are invited in industry. 
• Competitive price information should be kept confidential.  In the case of 
the Botswana Defence Force prices are disclosed only when the bids are 
opened and the lowest bidder is announced. 
• Unsuccessful bidders are then notified promptly.  Again this comes 
immediately as the winner of the bid is announced.  Further to that letters 
would be written to the unsuccessful bidders thanking them for their 
participation, as well as inviting them to do so next time. 
• All bidders are treated alike. 
• No bids are accepted after the bid closing date and time. 
• Bidders are not punished for apparent mistakes in their bids. 
• No auctions for low prices are to be done.  This may lead to the supplier 
cutting corners to avoid making loses. 
The BDF uses this specifically for all procurement of non-combat 
equipment.  Combat equipment here refers to all weapons, surveillance, military 
communications and similar equipment which require a different method that will 
be discussed later.  
2. Informal Tender 
At the time of writing these procedures, the PPADB had not yet 
promulgated their regulations.  The set price limits are the same as those set by 
the old CTB.  In the case of what MG Tlhokwane, called informal tender 
procedures, the limit for the procuring entity was BWP 10,000 - 100,000 
                                            
32See Burt, D.N., Dobler, D.W. and Starling, S.L. 2003.  World Class Supply ManagementSM : 
The Key to Supply Chain Management. McGraw-Hill Irwin. Page 547. 
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(approximately USD 2,000 - 20, 000)33.  This differs from country to country.  The 
figures do not reveal anything beyond specific government decision.  The 
procedure would otherwise be termed small purchase threshold also called 
simplified acquisition threshold which the USA Congress raised from USD 25,000 
to USD 100,000 during Operation Desert Storm, although at the time this applied 
only to Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) suppliers34.  However this 
has been revised to accommodate CONUS contractors.  This limit was later 
changed by the US Congress from USD 100,000 to 200,000 for CONUS 
contractors and to USD 300,000 for OCONUS by the Homeland Security Act of 
200235.  The earlier statutory relief compelled the outside contractors to still 
source their supplies from the US military contracting officers from the US based 
suppliers according to Wells (1995).  Botswana as a country has not been 
involved in a major war with another country so the limit of USD 20,000 for small 
purchases may still be unnecessary. The limit could be raised based on the 
threat.    
Further to the limitation of the contract price, the other control mechanism 
is the requirement for at least five quotations from capable suppliers36.  The 
procurement officer is not precluded by this to go for public tender if they so wish.  
It is there to ensure legality of a decision when avoiding public tendering 
procedures and their busy work.  This presupposes a desire to still motivate 
competition among suppliers – and by extension to limit corruption.   
3. Selective Tender37 
This procedure from PPADB, purports that certain equipment particularly 
for the disciplined forces is too sensitive for public tender.  It is an incapacitating 
thought process since it assumes that Botswana is the world.  Publications like 
                                            
33 This was an unpublished internal paper entitled “Tendering Guidelines for the Procuring 
Entities in the BDF”.   
34 See R. L. Wells. “Contracting Readiness:  Timely Support for Military Operations”. 
Acquisition Review Quarterly.  Winter 1995. Pages 42 - 64 
35 GAO report.  United States Accounting Office. Washington.  March 31, 2004. 
36 Ibid footnote 29. 
37 Ibid footnote 29. 
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Jane’s Information Group; Military Balance, Africa South of the Sahara etc. 
publish Botswana’s defense purchases.  The procedure thus paints the mistaken 
picture that once some purchase is kept away from the Botswana public 
knowledge then it is a secret.  It cannot be true because, equipment for defense 
is never produced in Botswana.    
Notwithstanding a schedule of the items that can be bought for the BDF is 
deposited with the PPADB for reference by the Special Procurement 
Committee38.  The committee is designed to adjudicate upon the selective 
tenders when they reach the PPADB.  This special treatment may become open 
to abuse by procurement officers and is herewith discouraged. 
4. Single or Sole Sourcing39 
These procedures are meant to accommodate disaster relief or a case of 
monopoly respectively.  Their combined treatment emanates from their legal 
similarity.  They both require a waiver from the PPADB prior to requesting 
quotations. 
Finally any purchases under USD 2,000 can be done outside the ambit of 
the PPADB oversight.   
Further to the procedures there are specific forms that must be filled.  
There are also prescriptive ways of designing invitations to tender (ITT).  The 
PPADB being in its formative toddler years still uses forms from its predecessor 
the CTB.  This carries on the legacy of the insufficient and apparently 
underhanded methods of the old order.  It would be a better morale booster for 
private business and the procurement workforce if there could have been an 
annihilation of the old methods for ever.  If the culture is to change, then, there is 
a need to work hard at encouraging just that.  A new culture can not get 
inculcated in peoples’ minds in a day40.  The artifacts of a moribund culture have 
                                            
38 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2001. Section 63. 
39 Ibid footnote 29. 
40 Greenberg, Jerald.  2002.  Managing Behavior in Organizations. 3rd Edition. Prentice Hall. 
Upper Saddle River. Page 314 – 315.  
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a tendency to keep the new one at bay.  The good work of changing methods of 
procurement for government will take a long time to be realized with the slow 
obliteration of the CTB legacy in peoples’ minds. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE BDF AND THE BRITISH (UK) MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE (MOD) ACQUISITION METHODS41 
The British are the former colonizers of Botswana.  Most of Botswana 
government procedure therefore follows the British ways.  It is thus proper to 
delve into this comparative episode.  The UK MOD has the Defence Council 
chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence being the most senior Minister in 
Defence.  The UK Parliament votes on the appropriation of public money and this 
includes military funding.  Further to that, the UK military has three service 
Boards for the Royal Navy, General Forces Command (Army) and the Royal Air 
Force (RAF).  The services are all under the civilian supervision of the Defence 
Council. This is similar to the Botswana situation where there is a Defence 
Council but composed of members of parliament and appointed by the President.  
The voting of public money also follows the same route.  However Botswana has 
only one service.    
In UK there are two ministers under the Secretary of State who deal with 
Armed Forces defense procurement, as well as operations and policy.  These 
ministers are each called Deputy Secretary of State.  There is also a third 
ministerial post of Parliamentary Under Secretary who is responsible for 
personnel and estate management.  All these four ministers answer to parliament 
on defense matters in UK.  Botswana does not have such sub division at 
ministerial level.  
In consonance with Thaga (2004)42, there is a debilitating sub-stratum in 
the BDF setup where the CDF is everything to the BDF.  Notwithstanding, being 
a civil servant, he has limited freedom to defend the government’s policies before 
                                            
41 All facts about the UK MOD were gleaned from Kausal, T. (editor). A Comparison of 
Defense Acquisition Systems of France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States. Defence 
Systems Management College. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 1999.  
42 Thaga, Laki S. March 2004. “Unpacking and Rearranging the Boxes”: The Search for New 
Institutional Matrix of Democratic Control of the Military in Botswana. Thesis for the Master of Arts 
in Security Studies at Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, Carlifornia. USA. 
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parliament.  He however has responsibility to answer to the Public Accounts 
Committee.  There are such committees in UK but there are also the 
parliamentary debates that elevate defense budgeting considerations to higher 
levels.   
At the civil service level the UK MOD has two co-heads, i.e. Chief of 
Defence Staff (CDS) who is a military officer and the Permanent Under Secretary 
of State (PUS) who is a civilian.  The former is the professional head of the 
Armed Forces while the PUS is the chief civilian advisor to government on 
defense matters.  The two have deputies under them who supervise the Central 
Staff at MOD.  At a professional level there are the three Chiefs of Staff for the 
services who report to the CDS/PUS.   
There is also a separate post of the Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) 
and this is the head of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA).  This shows the 
importance that the UK MOD attaches to defense procurement.  Defence 
procurement agencies in most countries of the world are possessed with the 
deepest pockets.  There is a need for a high level of decision making capability.  
In fact according to Burt et al (2003) referenced in Chapter I: 
The philosophy of World Class Supply ManagementSM requires 
change driven by upper management43. 
This suggests that there is currently a need to demand higher and higher 
responsibilities from those involved in purchasing and procurement matters.  The 
highest level for the BDF is the DCOS DLC, who is a Major General.  This thesis 
posits that it will be even more beneficial for the BDF to have a Major General 
directly responsible for Procurement and this should be separated from the 
Logistics Command. 
The UK MOD also has the post of Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA).  This 
officer is the best scientist or engineer who is brought into the service for a fixed 
term to advice on scientific matters in the procurement of defense equipment.  
                                            
43 Burt, D.N., Dobler D.W. and Starling, S.L. 2003. World Class Supply ManagementSM: The 
Key to Supply Chain Management.  McGraw Hill Irwin. Boston. Page 21. 
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This is the same scientist who influences the research direction at the Defence 
Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) – a government funded research 
agency that researches on defense equipment. 
All of the above are members of the Defence Council at the UK MOD, out 
of which the non-ministerial members form the Finance, Planning and 
Management Group (FPMG).  The FPMG is chaired by the PUS and it is 
responsible for reprogramming and planning.  BDF does not have that sort of 
arrangement.  The Defence Council is divorced from the plenary process.  
Planning is done and concluded at the BDF headquarters and the Defence 
Council comes in only to approve what has already been done by the BDF CDF.  
This is herewith considered an anomaly in a defense force, where civilian 
oversight demands that, program approval should be geared towards clear 
national defense interests.   
It is also postulated here; arguably, that a disposition is created that tends 
towards following pet projects by defense institutions in the absence of proper 
civilian oversight. The offshoot is the inevitable, disproportionate hemorrhage of 
the Consolidated Fund with no matching benefits.  Further there is no thorough 
financial analysis where the CDF will have to bring up net present value, 
sensitivity or even simulated analysis so that the Defence Council could take to 














The figure below summarizes the makeup of the UK MOD.  
 
Figure 3. The UK Defence Chain of Command 
 
There is a pressing need at this point to also compare the program costing 
methods of UK MOD with that of the BDF.  Whereas the BDF lacks the long term 
considerations of program costing in UK it is done.  This thesis can never 
overemphasize the need for this necessary approach to military defense 
procurement.  In UK there is what is called the Long Term Costing method.  This 
is both a plan and a program.  It has a thirty year strategic plan, a ten year 
equipment plan and a four year short term plan.  The four year plan is readjusted 
every year to cater for inevitable discrepancies in program costs that pervade the 
real world.  Their short term plans start in April each year with plans and this 
planning must be completed in September.  From there until October plans are 
finalized.  Budgets are created from October till January.  Whereas the Treasury 
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looks forward three years the MOD takes four.  The budget is actually designed 
by the Service Chiefs before it reaches the Secretary of State for Defence.  
These Service Chiefs provide the budget as well as the manpower to the DPA at 
all stages.  The Central Staff at MOD during this time submit User and System 
Requirement Documents (URDs and SRDs) through their Capability Working 
Groups (CWGs) headed by Capability Managers (CMs).  As it is the Service 
Chiefs would have contributed by clarifying what capabilities they require and the 
Central Staff would then submit to the Equipment Approvals Committee (EAC) all 
new equipment requirements.  The EAC can approve or disapprove any 
requirement for an amount between GBP 100 – 400m and over GBP 400m the 
approval is done by the Ministers.  The information about what equipment could 
be bought is obtained from the independent Defence Evaluation and Research 
Agency (DERA).  When the Ministers or the EAC approve a program then 
comparative assessment of the alternative equipment begins.  Then after 
commitment to a single project the demonstrations follow.  This is where one 
contractor will be selected. Manufacturing is allowed to start after appropriations 
from Parliament and after contract signing.  After all budget approvals including 
parliamentary appropriations, the DPA takes over and starts buying.    
This process has many checks and balances at different institutions and 
levels of decision making.  It is not foolproof definitely but it possesses the 
potency to equip the UK’s defense to a large extent.  The programs for each 
approved acquisition are run by integrated project teams (IPTs) with a wide 
range of expertise.  These IPTs become Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL) group 
after the equipment enters into service.   
When the equipment enters into service then that is where the CDL takes 
over, preferably with the same IPT and perhaps downsized as necessary.  The 
IPT is always expected to have clear disposal plans prior to a commitment to 
purchase.   
Figure 4, summarizes the process just described.  The solid arrows 
indicate the direction of communication and process flow.  The dotted arrows 
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show the process flow after approval. The acronyms are as described in the 
preceding discussion, except HL-URD and ISD which mean Higher Level User 
Requirement Document and In Service Date respectively.  The HL-URD is the 
base lined URD and it forms the Statement of Mission Needs.  ISD is the date 
when the equipment purchased is introduced into service.  This is a well defined 
process so that if there is a need to re-evaluate it then it will be easily traceable.  





Figure 4.  A Summary of the Phases of the UK MOD Defence Procurement 
 
C. COMPARISON OF THE BDF AND THE USA DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENCE (DOD) ACQUISITION METHODS 
The US military is arguably the most powerful in today’s world as the 
figures below will buttress.  It is thus crucial that the less developed military 
systems should draw lessons learned from them.  Botswana will do well to also 
utilize the wide experience of how the US military manages their large and 
complex systems.   
Source:  Kausal, T. (editor). A Comparison of Defense Acquisition Systems of France, Great 
Britain, Germany and the United States. Defence Systems Management College. Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia. 1999.  
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According to the CIA world fact book the US military had an estimated 
expenditure for 2004 (as at March 2003) of USD 370.0 billion and this was 3.3% 
of GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP, USD 2000)44. Further the US GDP and 
GDP per capita are skyrocketing at USD 10.45 trillion45 and USD 37,600 (PPP, 
USD 2000) respectively46.     According to Nationmaster.com, China comes a 
distant second at USD 5,989 billion and a GDP per capita of USD 5,00047.  But 
on an exchange rate basis the GDP for China becomes USD 1.4 trillion and GDP 
per capita becomes USD 1,09048.  Botswana has a small population of 
1,680,86349.  The GDP of Botswana stands at BWP 36,336.5 million 
(approximately USD 8,074 million on an exchange rate basis of BWP 4.5 to the 
USD)50 and a GDP per capita of USD 9,500 on a PPP basis51.  The GDP per 
capita becomes USD 4,000 on an exchange rate basis52.  As indicated in 
Chapter I of this thesis the defense expenditure takes around 3% of the country’s 
GDP.  Clearly this means the small population of the country should be afforded 
a good defense capability in terms of defense equipment.  It requires that a pro 
active acquisition method be designed and modified as and when needed to 
ensure value for money. 
Considering the many changes that the US DoD has gone through in 
acquisition reforms, it goes to show that they are not sitting on their laurels.  They 
have adopted a systems approach to their organizational design.  No process 
seems to have stayed permanent especially considering the period from 1987 to 
                                            
44 See http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Military (Accessed 
1/28/2005). 
45 See Nationmaster.com at http://www.nationmaster.com/red/graph-T/eco_gdp&int=50 
46 Ibid footnote 44. 
47Ibid footnote 45.  
48 See US Department of State website under the topic Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (Accessed 1/28/2005). 
49 See the Botswana Central Statistics website at  http://www.cso.gov.bw/ (Accessed 
1/29/2005). 
50 See the Bank of Botswana website at  
http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/files/attachments/a1268909878.xls  (Accessed 1/29/2005). 
51 See http://www.nationmaster.com/country/bc/Economy  (Accessed 1/29/2005). 
52 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm (Accessed 1/29/2005). 
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2003.  This thesis is averse to proposals towards mechanistic approaches to 
defense acquisition.  The approach used by the BDF is one of a prescriptive 
nature – effectively mechanistic in form as appears in MG Tlhokwane’s paper53.  
The danger of this form is that much as it maintains command and control, 
inefficiency reaches a high water mark when “lots of inflexible people…” get, 
“bogged down in lots of red tape”54.  The organic form (systems approach), on 
the other hand emphasizes self control, processes and outputs.  The processes 
in the middle become a black box to top management who must get feedback 
from the process principals.  They become responsible for the input, stipulate 
processes according to received feedback and expect the intended output.  
According to Wikipidea: 
 By taking a systems approach, we can see the whole complex of 
bidirectional interrelationships. Instead of analyzing a problem in 
terms of an input and an output, for example, we look at the whole 
system of inputs, processes, outputs, feedback, and controls. This 
larger picture will typically provide more useful results than 
traditional methods55. 
The systems approach which is favored herewith is permitted to avoid a 
top down decision making situation and allows employees a good amount of 
“empowered decision making”56, so they can do their jobs effectively.  Similar 
sentiments were expressed by John Dillard, in the following words: 
What the cumulative research appears to support is that, for large 
complex hierarchies such as the Department of Defense, 
decentralized control and empowerment should be an 
organizational strength, given today’s environment of program 
                                            
53 This was an unpublished internal paper entitled “Tendering Guidelines for the Procuring 
Entities in the BDF”.   
54 Greenberg, Jerald.  Managing Behavior in Organizations. 3rd Edition. Prentice Hall. Upper 
Saddle River. 2002. 
55 This quotation is from Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_thinking (Accessed 2/5/2005). 
56 Greenberg, Jerald.  Managing Behavior in Organizations. 3rd Edition. Prentice Hall. Upper 
Saddle River. 2002. 
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complexity, evolving requirements, and rapid changing 
technology57.  
The USA DoD, has through the past seventeen years been designing, 
modifying and redesigning new methods for their acquisition personnel to 
implement58.  The 1987 promulgation of the DoD 5000 documents started the 
process of reforms59. These documents were revised in 1991 and this led to the 
National Performance Review60.  Prior to this Dick Cheney, Secretary of 
Defense, had written to the President indicating that, layers of authority, 
duplicative programs across services and general ballooning costs were the 
culprits of poor acquisition processes in the DoD61.  The 1993 National 
Performance Review (NPR) set pace for a decade long process of improving the 
defense acquisition methods.  This among other things required that the US 
government should change the otherwise bureaucratic layered systems of the 
1980s which had intended to cut down on the costs of acquisition of the particular 
period62.   
The real reforms under the NPR came in 1995 following the Perry Memo 
of February 9, 1994 and the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act  
of 1993 (FASA)63.  These were followed by the Defense Reform Initiative of 1997 
to 1999.  These inventions were found to have brought about supply problems 
and were to change in 1999 with Gansler’s ‘The Road Ahead: Accelerating the 
Transformation of the Department of Defense Acquisition and Processes and 
Practices’.  J.S Gansler was the then Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition, 
                                            
57 Dillard, John. 2003. “Centralized Control of Defence Acquisition Programs: A Comparative 
Review of the Framework from 1987 – 2003”. Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, California. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See DoD Directive 5000.1.  Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 
September 1, 1987. 
60 Rogers, Edward W. and Birmingham, Robert P. “A Ten Year Review of the Vision for 
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Technology and Logistics at the US DoD.  The underlying demands were that 
acquisition was to be, “…faster...cheaper…and cheaper…”  The authors of the 
article argue that, this led to the responsibility for failure “migrating to the 
contractor”, which should be discouraged, in the case of the BDF.  If this 
assumes pre-eminence it could lead to a defense force that had to dance to the 
demands of the contractor.  The CDF’s needs assessments should determine the 
course of acquisition. 
In 2000 when the Republican Party won the mandate to govern this was 
changed to address the problem of the succession gap.  The change led to the 
repealing of the DoD 5000 series, as they were after 1996, which were 
considered “too prescriptive” to permit “more PM (program manager- emphasis 
mine) discretion”64.  These frequent changes led to some initiatives not being 
designed for use in the first place.  Johnson and Johnson (2002)65  discussing 
the latest acquisition processes contend that: 
The checks and balances put in place to ensure the acquisition 
office is doing it right often contribute to why it takes so long to do it 
at all.  
However the current changes seem to want to control the technology 
“cycle gap”, between the military and business.  It states as its premise the idea 
of “evolutionary acquisition (EA)”, which requires initial delivery of less than full 
capability to ensure affordability, risk reduction and agility as tradeoffs66.  
However the main undoing in the US was the initial lack of clear systems model 
design for the benefit of the implementers.  This led to ambiguity and conflict 
which Sylvester and Ferrara do not see as “necessarily counter productive”; in 
fact possessed with the potential to be “improved as the organization undergoes 
an iterative process of interpretation, conflict, and refinement”.  This penmanship 
                                            
64 Ibid. 
65 Johnson, Wayne M. and Johnson, Carl O. “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition:  
A Practical Approach towards Evolutionary Acquisition”. Acquisition Defense Quarterly. Summer 
2002. 
66 Richard Sylvester and Joseph Ferrara in an article “Conflict and Ambiguity:  Implementing 
Evolutionary Acquisition” published in Acquisition Review Quarterly, 2003. 
 31 
begs to differ with such trial and error attempts to convert trenchant phraseology 
into policy.  
However terminology aside, this story of EA is interesting in the light of the 
formation of the BDF DCOS DLC where no such civilian oversight rules, 
regulations and laws had been implemented at such fast paces as in the USA.  It 
is persuasive that the idea of more flexibility is relevant to the BDF case.  The 
first impression with it is that it seeks to address operational needs satisfaction 
faster and better. This therefore begs the question:  Should the BDF employ EA? 
This shall be left here for later consideration. 
There are critics however of EA.  Some researchers argue that hitherto 
only conflict and ambiguity can be realized from EA.  This inevitable conflict they 
argue is good for the subsequent refinement of the policy implementation67.  Any 
organization experiences conflict and any policy change is bound to usher in its 
own dose of it.  As for ambiguity the authors bring in a mind gripping point when 
they refer to Lindblom’s ‘successive limited comparisons’.  They conclude that 
the ambiguity leads to policy makers “blending rationality with realism”.  Although 
this is good, one cannot ignore the possibility of abuse by the participants who 
are more powerful than others.  Resultant influences towards a course of action 
or decision point have been established to reside in the influencer’s positional 
and/or personal power68.  The policy must thus incorporate methods of control 
and punishment for abusers.  EA if more clearly defined in terms of the systems 
model could benefit a small budget.  The BDF may have to investigate this 
further and perhaps even court it. 
But how is the acquisition workforce regulated in the US DoD.  At the 
federal level there is the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)69, that stipulate 
expected procedures and responsibilities for the whole US federal government 
acquisition workforce.  This will be similar to the PPADB of Botswana already 
                                            
67Ibid. 
68 Yukl, G. Use Power Effectively.  In E.A.Locke (ed.), The Blakwell Principles of 
Organizational Behavior (pp 241-256).  Oxford, England.  Blackwell. 
69 See the Federal Acquisition Regulations homepage at http://www.arnet.gov/far/. 
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discussed above.  But this thesis desires to confine itself to the DoD FAR 





Figure 5. US DoD Decision Support inputs  
 
The Defense Acquisition System, in the US DoD, to whom all the inputs 
arrive is headed by an MDA who is responsible for programs including 
Congressional testimonies70.  The duty of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJSS), according to this directive is to give advice on military capability 
created by the programs according to Title 10, United States Code, Armed 
Forces.  He is not the buyer like in the case of the BDF where the CDF is the 
user, planner, buyer and manager of programs.  The MDA exercises oversight 
over the Defense Acquisition System71.   
The other attractive twist to the story is the Defense Acquisition Regulation 
System (DARS), headed by the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy (DPAP) and does the design and management of the regulations72.  Since 
Botswana is a small country and the BDF equally small by all standards, this 
aspect of the defense regulations being headed by other than a department of 
                                            
70 Department of Defense. USD (AT&L). DoD Directive 5000.1. May 12, 2003. 
71 Department of Defense. USD (AT&L). DoD Directive 5000.1. May 12, 2003. 
72 See http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/index.htm (Accessed 2/7/2005) 
Source: http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document (Accessed 
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the PPADB may unnecessarily stretch the meager resources.  However since 
there is a Special Tender Committee at PPADB this should have military 
personnel of the right qualifications and experience, to design and manage 
defense acquisition regulations under the leadership of the PPADB boss – not 
the CDF. 
Another point of discussion that affects the arming of the US military is the 
use of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Systems (PPBES).  
This is a strategic tool that plans for long term horizon programs and reprograms 
each year within the program period.  The PPBES is the responsibility of Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) which sets policy, allocates resources and 
prioritizes the DoD requirements73.  With a Ministry of Defence in Botswana this 
would be the responsibility of the minister.  But then there is the Defence Council 




                                            




Figure 6. PPBES for the on (even-numbered) years and the off (odd 
numbered) years  
 
According to the PPBES74 the military services are required to submit their 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission (BES) 
during the on-years.  The CJCS provides the Joint Program Guide (JPG).  The 
Program Decision Memorandum from the OSD follows after all the POM/BES of 
the on-year and the PCP/BCP of the off-year, towards the end of the year.  Prior 
to the PDM, the Program Budget Decisions (PBD) is developed by the Office of 
Management and Budgeting (OMB), which is outside the DoD and is responsible 
for the President’s budget.  This is similar in many ways to the UK MOD’s LTC 
discussed above.  The BDF lacks the long term planning instrument similar to the 
two defense departments already discussed.  It follows logically that, poor 
planning and a lack of defined programs are not too friendly to the public purse.  
It leads to spending for the sake of depleting the yearly allocation and other ills 
like the pursuit of pet projects. 
                                            
74 See http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document (Accessed 2/7/2005) 
Source:  http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document (Accessed 2/7/2005)
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The main undoing in the new system instituted by the current US 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Rumsfeld, is the requirement for the many 
reviews.  It seems like a tongue-in-cheek attitude.  It is good that the 
administration of the day requires EA, flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency for 
the PMs, but to do that through more required reviews, than the past “broken” 
systems is difficult to learn by small armies.    
Small armies in small democracies like Botswana should be thoroughly 
encouraged to cut down the bureaucracy by laying down rules and corrective 
measures and then leaving their program managers to do their jobs.  John Dillard 
captured this very well in his comparison of the different processes used in the 
US defense acquisition system.  The figure below shows just how the different 
US processes evolved.  However the fact that there were reviews shows that 
something was being attempted towards improvement.  Perhaps this is also 
enhanced by the fact that decision making is pegged at national level being 




Figure 7. The Life Cycle Systems Management (LCSM) model according to 




Source: Dillard, John. 2003. “Centralized Control of Defence Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of 













Figure 9. The Defense Systems Acquisition Management model following the 
DoD Instruction 5000-2R   
 
Source: Dillard, John. 2003. “Centralized Control of Defence Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of the 
Framework from 1987 – 2003”. Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, California.
Source: Dillard, John. 2003. “Centralized Control of Defence Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of the 





Figure10. The latest model requiring EA and following the latest DoD 5000.2 
document.  Adopted from John Dillard 2003 
 
D. COMPARISON OF THE BDF AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTRY 
OF DEFENCE (MOD) ACQUISITION METHODS 
It will be proper to conclude this chapter with a look at the South African 
defense acquisition method.  South Africa is Botswana’s most powerful neighbor 
in military terms.  It also espouses the principle of civilian oversight of the military.  
It is a new but large democracy in Southern Africa.    
The current strength of the South African National Defence Force currently 
stands at 74,811 with military personnel totaling 59,214 and other public servants 
making up the remainder of 15,59775.  This is proportional to the geographic area 
of the country as well as the population size.  The geographic area is 1,219,912 
square kilometers and the population is 42,718,53076. Botswana on the other 
hand has a total land coverage of 585,370 sq km and 15,000 sq km covered by 
water77.  The population of Botswana is currently estimated at 1,680,86378  
                                            
75 See http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/StrategicPlan/DODstratplan04to07r.pdf. (Accessed 
2/28/2005). 
76 See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sf.html. (Accessed 2/28/2005). 
77 See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bc.html. (Accessed 2/28/2005). 
78 See http://www.cso.gov.bw/. (Accessed 2/28/2005). 
Source: Dillard, John. 2003. “Centralized Control of Defence Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of 
the Framework from 1987 – 2003”. Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, California. 
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according to the 2001 population and housing census.  Its military strength of is 
estimated by Jane’s Information Group as amounting to 10,000 personnel79.  
Jane’s further portrays the size of BDF to portend disproportion when they said 
that: 
Given the small size of Botswana’s population, this is a large force.  
This is outrageous to put it in lenient terms.  The percentage of the BDF 
strength to the population is 0.59%.  This is far from enough to cover the 
geographical area of the country.  The BDF’s mission is to defend the country 
against external aggression.  It is not for the individual household to have a 
soldier guarding it, as Jane’s seems to be portraying.  The South African defense 
percentage of the population as currently reported by the figures above is 
0.175%.  But assuming recourse to the strength in relation to the geographic 
area of South Africa, this would be substantial comparatively.  Botswana will 
have 0.017 soldiers per square kilometer, whilst South Africa has 0.048.  These 
numbers are far from portraying extravagant expenditures on defense by the two 
countries. 
The comparison continues here, to the structure of the South African 
Department of Defence.  Botswana does not have a Ministry/Department of 
Defence.  The figure below is the organizational structure of the South African 
DOD80. 
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Figure11. Structure of the South African DOD  
 
The above figure shows that Acquisition and Procurement Division is 
under the Secretary for Defence and not the services.  The BDF on the other has 
DMAP under the CDF in general and the DCOS-DLC in particular.  It is a BDF 
function not a Ministry function.  It has already been indicated above that this 
leaves a lot of important players outside the defense acquisition loop.   
Further to the comparison at the political/administrative level there is also 
the structure of DMAP and the South African Departmental Acquisition and 
Procurement Division (DAPD) that will be addressed.  The DAPD as it falls under 
the Secretary of Defence is composed of qualified military and civilian personnel.  
This is similar to both the UK MOD and the USA DoD arrangements.  The 
arrangement elevates defense procurement to national level and also allows only 
the specialists to man key positions.  The figure below is the structure of the 
DAPD81. 
                                            







Figure12. DAPD Organizational Structure  
 
The Chief of Acquisition and Procurement, the Budget Officer and the Chief 
Director Procurement were senior civilian personnel and the rest were military 
officers of the rank of Colonel and above at the time of writing.  It is not clear 
what the distinction between acquisition and procurement is in the South African 
context although there is the Chief Directors of both Acquisition and 
Procurement.  Notwithstanding acquisition is elevated to political oversight level, 



































According to the South African Defence Review of 1998 at Chapter 1382, 
acquisition is planned for on a multi-year basis for the Core Defence Technology 
Programs.  However the Armament Acquisition Council (AAC) chaired by the 
Minister of Defence approves/disapproves programs.  It also performs yearly 
reviews of running programs.  The AAC is the highest approval level for defense 
acquisition.  But then there is a lower body called the Armament Acquisition 
Steering Board (AASB) chaired by the Secretary for Defence, which approves 
non-cardinal projects.  Cardinality of a project is determined by its total value.  It 
is a program over ZAR 80 million that is considered cardinal.  This is set at BWP 
100m for the BDF.  Before the AASB all projects pass through the Armament 
Acquisition Board (AACB) chaired by the Chief of Acquisition and it screens all 
projects in terms of resources and user requirements satisfaction.   
The DOD also publishes the Long Term Requirements Statement (LTRS) 
to guide long term acquisition of programs.  This is similar to the UK’s LTC and 
the USA’s PPBES.  BDF does not have this.  The South African DOD uses “fair 
and open competition”. The methods used by the BDF include among others 
selective tendering which has the potential to limit competition – particularly for 
arms and ammunition procurement.  This method should be discouraged seeing 
that all equipment bought is finally published in international journals like Jane’s 
Information Group and others.   This thesis argues for the repealing of the 
demand by government of selective tendering in favor of full and open 
competition.  Selective tendering has not ensured secrecy of the BDF inventory.  
It can only serve to expose DMAP to temptations towards favoritism or deliberate 
suppression of competition.   
It is best now rather than later to require full and open competition for all 
defense acquisitions, in the BDF.  A detailed suggested structure of Botswana’s 
defense acquisition department together with the suggested contracting 
processes will be part of the next chapter’s offerings. 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. RESULTS 
1. Introduction 
Acquisition of equipment is considered herein, to be the required spring 
board for favorable reliability, operational availability and maintainability or the 
lack thereof.  All interested parties must be invited to assist in deciding on a 
defense acquisition.  This approach elevates customer satisfaction to be the 
main reason for procurement of equipment.  This is the approach built into the 
questionnaire used for this research.  Benjamin Blanchard (2004)83 required that 
system engineering should be a top down approach which this thesis supports.    
There is a need also for a life cycle costing approach covering all the 
necessary aspects of initial user requirements; design; development and 
production and in service support package.  Disposal planning also has an 
important bearing on logistics support.  Equipment that is procured without a 
disposal plan always leaves unnecessary artifacts of old systems lying around.   
It also delays the procurement of new equipment with better logistics factors as 
per the demands of changing technologies.  The US DoD in recognition of these 
aspects requires that, there should a balance between mission accomplishment 
and costs of the out-years, in an acquisition strategy84.   
Further to that there is an indispensable need for a team approach by all 
stakeholders85.  This involves the use of a systems engineering approach.  The 
team should include the user as the initiator of an acquisition interest.  Then 
there should be the invitation of technologists, logisticians etc by the program 
manager.  Research has proven this method to work better than an isolationist 
approach86, where the procurement officer decides alone.   
                                            
83Benjamin S Blanchard. 2004. Logistics Engineering and Management. 6th edition. 
84 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation). “Cost Analysis and 
Guidance Procedures”. US Department of Defense. December 11, 1992. Page 44. 
85 Anonymous. Acquisition Strategy Guide. Defense Systems Management College Press. 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. December 1999.  Page 3-5. 
86 Ibid. 
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The survey for this thesis was sent to all officers for the particular purpose 
of capturing all the stakeholders’ interests in the BDF.   
There were ten variables that this thesis sought to investigate, to unveil 
the satisfaction level of the officer corps of the BDF with acquisition.  These are 
Time for trials and evaluation; Deliveries lead time; Equipment variety; Inventory 
management; Quality of acquisition personnel; Supplier preference; Duration of 
supply contract; Reliability, Availability and Maintainability; Relations with PPADB 
and finally Experienced downtime.  These were selected with reference to 
established research and books, e.g. Blanchard (2004), US DoD guides and the 
methods gleaned from the comparative exploratory study of Chapter II above. 
They are labeled (a) to (j) in their respective order.  These are intended to show 
that if procurement could have been done differently from the present methods, 
then better inventory of equipment would be occupying the armories of the BDF.  
The BDF, with its small budget, does not have the luxury to entertain trial and 
error acquisition methods.  Explanations of the variables follow below: 
a. Time for Trials and Evaluation 
In the USA trials and evaluation is called Initial Operational Test 
and Evaluation (IOT&E)87.  These are field tests on the product or product 
representative.  It is done before a final decision to buy is entered into.  The 
product must be tested using typical operational personnel in typical operational 
conditions.  If the equipment/product fails to meet expectations then it is usually 
not purchased.  This requires a deliberate process and it takes time.  This if done 
purposefully will help in making a long term decision, not limited to meet the 
demands of the twelve months financial year only. 
The BDF cannot afford specifically designed equipment.  The 
budget is too small to foot the required bill for that.  The advantage that BDF has 
is that technology is already available in abundance all over the world.  Some of 
this would perform well in the Botswana operating conditions.  (Recall from the 
BDF Act, that the BDF is for defense and not outside military excursions).  It is in 
                                            
87 Anonymous. 2001. Test and Evaluation Management Guide. Defense Acquisition 
University Press. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Pages 11-2 to 11-3. 
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this regard that one looks at the number of military manufacturers in the world 
and believes that something is definitely there for the BDF.  It just requires to be 
proven through trials and evaluation: IOTE in the US DoD88.    
Equipment that has already been designed by manufacturers is 
normally brought into Botswana to be evaluated under the BDF’s operating 
conditions.  This is the stage of collecting data on the equipment of interest to 
ensure that it can withstand the Botswana climate as well as the BDF doctrine.   
This is an important variable to be evaluated.  The scale for the 
question would be most favorable at five when the period is more than just twelve 
months and decreases to one on a scale.  The variable had two questions one 
asking whether the period is more than or less than twelve months and the other 
asking whether the BDF officers are satisfied with the equipment before it is 
bought, i.e. through trials and evaluation.  The two answers were averaged out to 
give the variable score for variable (a). 
b. Deliveries Lead Time 
This is the length of time from ordering to the time that the shipment 
is received in inventory89.  Most deliveries are done in a matter of months90.  
However when there is design and development involved this could take years.  
The BDF buys after these stages.  There is also the distance between a typical 
supplier location and Botswana.  For purposes of reducing the down time relating 
both to new purchases and the support of extant equipment this has to be 
investigated to see how much of this variable maximizes the BDF’s utility 
function. 
Once a decision to buy has been entered into the user then is 
charged with expectation.  If this order is done before the trials and evaluation 
then there is going to be a delay since the trials would be required to be carried 
out.  Further to that there is nothing that will stop the manufacturer from starting 
                                            
88 Anonymous. 2001. Test and Evaluation Management Guide. Defense Acquisition 
University Press. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Pages 11-2 to 11-3.  
89 Ibid, footnote 4 on page 110. 
90 Ibid, footnote 7 on page 262. 
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production in that case.  In this regard, a decision to buy made after thorough 
trials and evaluation, should result in a shorter lead time.  Industries shorten 
theirs lead times through fewer regulations.  Perhaps it can be concluded that 
governments do not enjoy such liberty for accountability purposes. Typical 
deliveries lead times are normally longer for government procurement officers, 
because they are “stewards of the public trust”91.  This has to be shortened by 
forward planning by the acquisition officers.    One of the ways to do that is the 
performance of trials and evaluation prior to placement of order. 
There were two sub questions for this variable.  One question 
asked the respondents to declare whether it takes longer or shorter than twelve 
months to receive equipment, once the order has been placed.  The other 
question wanted to find out if the users are served well by the current standard of 
deliveries lead time.  The scale was set to be most favorable if the lead time was 
less than twelve months and reduce accordingly.  For the second sub question 
the scale started at five, for a lack of satisfaction, ending at one for satisfaction 
with the current trends.  This thesis posits that it does take a long time to receive 
ordered equipment and that this is not good for operational and training 
purposes.  Again the two answers were averaged out to give the variable score 
for (b). 
c. Equipment Variety 
The variety of equipment means that mission success depends on 
their individual spares requirements.  The variety further means more 
maintenance funds would be used since the spares requirements will be 
higher92.  This is more expensive than when there is one type of equipment.  The 
purpose of this variable is to discover if it helps operations to have, for instance, 
five types of rifles serving the same purpose or streamlining towards 
specialization.   
                                            
91 See Burt et al. 2003. WSCMSM: The Key to Supply Chain Management. McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
7th edition at page 596. 
92 Ibid, footnote 4. Pages 103-104 
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It is demanded here that, the less the variety the more favorable the 
cost structure for logistics93.  Variety as indicated in earlier chapters and above 
does not enhance shorter downtime.  There is all the different spares that have to 
be sourced from the different sources; the amount of training that has to be given 
to technicians and their increased overall number to cater for the variety; as well 
as the loss of visibility94.   
There were two questions covering those areas for this variable.  
The first question wanted to find out whether the respondent believed there was 
variety.  It there was the score was five at the highest level reducing to one on a 
scale.  The second question required the officer, to say from their experience, 
whether the variety serves their operational capability well.  This would be 
awarded one for an affirmative answer reducing to one on scale.  Again an 
average was taken as above to get a score for variable (c). 
d. Inventory Management 
Keebom Kang (1998)95 found that excess inventory ties down 
funds.  One of the culprits for the excess is the lack of asset visibility.  This could 
lead to purchasing spare parts that are already there in inventory held by another 
US DoD service.  By extension, the BDF may have similar problems where an 
item in stock may be reported as out of stock.  Obviously an equipment 
breakdown would not be attended to during purported stock out periods. This 
naturally contributes to downtime.  Asset visibility is a requirement that cannot be 
ignored.   
While procurement concentrated on buying equipment through the 
years in the BDF, there was no attempt to collect data on the performance of the 
inventory.  This leads to complications when troubleshooting has to be done.  It is 
almost impossible to access data on any equipment.  The reports are passed on 
by oral methods, when a decision has to be made on any equipment at the nick 
                                            
93 Benjamin S Blanchard. 2004. Logistics Engineering and Management. 6th edition. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Kang, Keebom. 1998. “DoD Inventory Management Cultural Changes and Training in 
Commercial Practices”. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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of time.  Some records are available on hard copy, a method notorious for 
introducing human error, hence poor data quality.  The standard of data quality 
could easily be the final arbiter, between mission success and loss of lives96. 
In order to measure the satisfaction level on inventory management 
methods, two questions were asked.  One intended to show whether officers 
knew of any automated information system, that made data access easy – hence 
improved its quality.  The scale for the sub question started at five when the 
officer believes there was automation and reduced to one accordingly.  The 
second sub question wanted to find out whether there was ease of access to 
data and if this was the case, this would be scored at five reducing to one where 
it was not.  Finally the two questions were averaged out to get the score for 
variable (d). 
e. Quality of Acquisition Personnel 
There are divergent views pertaining to professionalization in 
general97.  There are arguments that it ushers in mediocrity, as it places 
emphasis on a Diploma and not service. The proponents pick a few examples 
from classical professions like Law; Medicine etc.  But this thesis identifies with 
education and training as the basis for better comprehension of the demands of 
any profession.  Failure to utilize the learning is more an individual problem than 
a professional blanket issue.   This thesis investigates questions of level of 
training and experience.   
It is critical to morale when the users do not trust the offerings of a 
supplier of services98.  A professional acquisition workforce will have the 
confidence of the customers naturally.   
The variable to measure this was divided into two questions as 
well.  The first part measured the extent of qualifications of the acquisition 
                                            
96 For details see Anonymous. DOD Guidelines on Data Quality at 
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4/23/2005) 
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personnel – the more qualified the better.  Further to improve the quality of 
decision making there has to be some level of experience which mainly goes with 
rank.  Since the BDF is a young army, it is postulated here that the rank of Major 
should be the minimum requirement to head a department of acquisition at any 
level.  The scale for these sub parts both started at five when there was a 
favorable environment as explained above with five being the most favorable 
score and one the least favorable.  Then the average was taken to get the 
variable score for (e). 
f. Supplier Preference 
The BDF like other government departments is charged with a 
citizen empowerment function.  This is embedded in the PPADB Act of 2001.  It 
follows that other countries also protect their own local supplier base.  The USA 
has the Buy American Act (BAA) of 1933.  The Act has complicated acquisition 
mangers’ job of getting good value for money99, as required by the US Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR).  But it cajoles the economy well especially in a 
time of depression: there was a depression in the USA at the time of enactment 
of BAA and in the 1980s at the pinnacle of the cold war.  Any award of a contract 
to any foreign supplier in the USA requires prior approval – and this is a source 
of delay100. Botswana has a small manufacturing base and a non-existent 
defense manufacturing capacity: the author knows this from experience.  
Perhaps the USA can enforce the BAA trusting for delivery by the locals: 
Botswana cannot, it needs international trade in defense products.  The BDF 
needs to work within and around the preferential treatment clause in the legal 
landscape.  Mission satisfaction should reign supreme in the search for the right 
defense equipment.  
It is herein considered bad business practice to give a supplier 
preference simply on the basis of citizenship, unless the citizen meets the 
solicitation requirements.  Although the PPADB Act101 requires that government 
                                            
99 Smyth, Joseph S.  “The Impact of the Buy American Act on Program Managers”. 
Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1999. Pages 263 – 272. 
100 Ibid 
101 Ibid, footnote 17. 
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agencies should give preference to citizen suppliers, it is difficult to imagine that 
being fulfilled in the case of military equipment.  As mentioned earlier most 
Botswana businesses dealing in military equipment operate at an agency level.  
Award of a contract to the Botswana agent therefore, does not translate into 
socio-economic benefits to the country.  The manufacturing and hence the jobs 
associated with that would still be done outside Botswana.  Unless the notion of 
citizen supplier preference could be modified to citizen supplier enrichment, this 
thesis pleads for the liberty to stand at cudgels drawn.  This thesis differs with the 
notion of preference for citizens, if this ignores value for money particularly for 
products procured for the high purpose of national defense.  It is preferred 
herein, that fair and reasonable price of a purchase must take preeminence.  If 
the BDF’s statutory mission was to provide absorption of the offerings of the local 
business community, then it would have become clear when the legislators 
passed the BDF Act.  The US defense acquisition workforce is not finding it easy 
to satisfy the Buy American Act, while at the same time cultivating competition102.  
It is this competition that leads to best value in markets – an issue already 
discussed above.  It is in the interest of all suppliers to create goodwill through 
satisfactory products.   
Again there were two sub questions for this variable.  It was 
imperative that the favorable score of five be awarded when the respondent said 
there was no bias to just buy from locals.  When there is sealed bidding, 
especially, then it should be most favorable (a score of five) when there is no 
citizen preference, for the first sub question.  When the officer respondent 
believes that only price is the determinant for winning a contract, then the score 
should be five reducing to one accordingly.   These scores were then averaged 
to give the variable score for (f). 
 
 
                                            
102 Smyth, Joseph S.  “The Impact of the Buy American Act on Program Managers”. 
Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1999. Pages 263 – 272. 
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g. Duration of Supply Contract 
The logic for the preferred duration follows the PPBES explained 
well by McCaffery and Jones (2004)103.  It is better for planning to have a long 
term contract than a short one.  The respondents would declare whether they 
prefer the extant short term contracts and its concomitant shortcomings or the 
long term version? 
The extension of the duration of the supply contract beyond the 
present twelve months financial year limits, allows among other things 
improvements on the original contract.  Further to that since a supplier is 
motivated by the assurance of more deliveries they can be encouraged to lower 
prices and perform better. This also saves on the time to be performing new 
preproduction trials and evaluation each year.  It means that the only needed 
trials and evaluation will be those at the operational level leading to 
improvements104 prior to the next deliveries.   
There were two sub questions that sought to evaluate the 
satisfaction level with the duration of supply contract.  The first sub questions 
sought to establish whether, it is a fact that yearly contracting was the norm.  If it 
was then this will mean a score of one increasing to five on a scale.  Further to 
that the second sub part wanted the officer to say whether they are happy with 
the present durations.  If they were, then their answers were awarded a score of 
one increasing on a scale with their dissatisfaction, in line with theory - already 
treated.  An average was also taken as above for the variable score for (g). 
h. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability 
Norcross (1997)105 decried the burden that these logistics 
parameters had on the US Marine Corps, when he said: 
                                            
103 See Jerry L McCaffery and L R Jones. 2004. Budgeting and Financial Management for 
National Defense: A volume in research in public management. Information Age Publishing. page 
370. 
104 See the reasoning for longer period programs from the treatment of the UK MOD’s LTC 
in Kausal (ed.) – footnote 41.  
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…unmet reliability thresholds…, drain …scarce funding from other 
priorities. 
The statement applies equally well to reliability, availability and 
maintainability.  These metrics must of necessity have been elevated to 
acceptable levels by the acquisition process.  The satisfaction with these 
variables was measured to conclude whether the BDF acquisition system 
improves or worsens the burden. 
These elements of logistics106 support pivot directly on the quality 
of the original product to the most part.  Of course, they are also affected by the 
quality of the technicians and engineers at maintenance depots.  This means that 
the maladies of logistics can be reduced by proper purchasing processes. 
There were three sub parts to this variable designed to properly 
capture the essence of the three logistics terms above.  It could not be done with 
fewer questions.  Clearly it is better to have a high measure of all these logistics 
elements.  When the respondent is satisfied to the highest level, his answers 
were given a score of five.  This would reduce accordingly to one with the 
satisfaction level.  Then these scores were averaged for the variable score for 
(h). 
i. Relations with PPADB 
The PPADB is a new control body.  The BDF officers were asked to 
give first impressions during these early years of the PPADB’s life.  
The individuals would finally answer a question that reveals 
whether the answers came from a user, maintenance personnel, acquisition 
personnel or Command (CO and above).  This was used to find out the level of 
satisfaction within each of the groups.  But the total results of the interview were 
used to do the statistical analysis. 
                                            
105 Norcross,Jr. Marvin J. “The Requirement for Acquisition and Logistics Integration: An 
Examination of Reliability Management in the Marine Corps Acquisition Process” – a thesis for 
Master of Science in Management,  Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
106 Ibid, footnote 4 at page 46 to 77 for details of calculations. 
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The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB)107 is 
the new control body overseeing all government purchasing and disposal.  The 
variable pertaining to their rules and regulations was intended to capture the 
sentiments already formed during the life of PPADB so far.  The three sub parts 
were intended to show whether officers preferred to have the professionalism 
orientation that this board wants to inculcate or they would rather have the old 
systems with their trial and error disposition.  
The first and the third sub questions were scored from five to one 
on a scale while the second was scored from one to five.   Then the variable 
score was calculated for (i). 
j. Experienced Turnaround Time 
In tandem with the definition of turnaround time or down time 
already given in Chapter I above the smaller the turnaround time the better.  This 
thesis uses ten days as the benchmark.  Blanchard (2004) defines these terms 
as referring to the same concept108.  For the first sub question, if the downtime 
was considered smaller than ten days then the respondent’s answer was given a 
score of five.  The second sub part assumes a current downtime or turnaround 
time that is unsatisfactory.  It demands that the respondent declare whether they 
are satisfied or not.  If they are satisfied then they were considered to have given 
the smallest score.  Also for this variable (j) an average was taken. 
2. Summarized Results 











                                            
107 Benjamin S Blanchard. 2004. Logistics Engineering and Management. 6th edition. 

















There were a total of seventy two respondents for this research out of a 
selected sample frame of approximately one thousand officers of the BDF.  This 
is a large enough response to assume normality which the chi test for normality 
sought to reveal below.  From the table above it is also apparent that very few 
officers are satisfied at four to five levels.  Most of the responses are scored at 
around three and below.  
The respondents are just barely satisfied with trials and evaluation times; 
supplier preference methods used; duration of supply contracts and working 
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relations of the BDF with PPADB.  All the other variables earned an 
unsatisfactory grade. 
3. Regression Analysis 
The table below shows the regression analysis of the results with 
downtime satisfaction level (j) as the dependent variable and the rest as 
independent variables. 
Table 3. Regression analysis of the results in Table 2 
 
The results above reveal an interesting phenomenon.  The regression 
equation that comes out of table is as follows: 
j = 0.376 – 0.134b – 0.009c + 0.026d – 0.101e + 0.190f – 0.015g + 
0.132h + 0.536i.  
The coefficient of determination (R2) is only twenty nine percent (29%).  
This shows that the satisfaction or lack thereof with the equipment downtime is 
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explained seventy one percent (71%) of the time by other variables than those 
relating to acquisition.  The standard error of estimate (sε) which is required to be 
close to zero because sε, is the square root of the squared deviations from the 
regression line is 0.87 – almost 1.  The mean value for the dependent variable is 
2.3 from Table 2, so that when sε, at 0.87 is large and cannot be used to 
conclude goodness of fit for the regression model.  This is in agreement with the 
value of R2 above. 
There is an intercept value of 0.376, indicating that there will only be about 
38% satisfaction caused by other than acquisition issues, even when the down 
time level is 100% satisfactory.  This makes mathematical sense, but has no 
room in applications.  It cannot be used here because there is none of the 
independent variables, which includes a zero109.  The intercept is thus of no 
consequence here. 
Further to the above all the coefficients have relatively large standard 
errors.  The t-statistic for each variable and their p-values also indicate that there 
is no evidence to infer linearity of relationship between downtime satisfaction 
levels with those of the acquisition related independent variables.  A more 
detailed interpretation will be afforded by the analysis part of the write-up below.   
The next results report on the chi squared test for normality.  This is 
important to find out whether there was independence of responses from the 
data that was collected.  Each question was tested using Microsoft Office Excel 








                                            
109 For details see G Keller and B Warack. 2003. Statistics for Management and Economics. 
6th Edition. Thomson Brooks/Cole. Toronto. Pages 531 to 537. 
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4. Chi Squared Test for Normality 
The following table is a summary of the Chi Tests for Normality for the 
different variables in Table 2 above.  
Table 4. Summarized Results of the Chi Squared Test for Normality 
Normality is established in the above table for all responses except for 
variable (e) and (g). The chi-squared statistic for (e) and (g) are 26.4 and 18.8 
respectively, which is higher than the chi squared critical value of 3.8.  This 
deviation will be explained further in the analysis part that follows.  The deviation 
casts aspersion on the results for the particular variables from Table 2.   
B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
1. General Comments 
Table 2 above shows that generally the officers are dissatisfied with 
acquisition processes and its resultant downtime in later years of the equipment’s 
life.  The results prove the null hypothesis that there are methods which can be 
used to improve on that.  This dissatisfaction belies a pedestrian mentality 
towards acquisition.    
Acquisition as a part of supply management110 has to be elevated to a 
high level of quality provision.  This is the point of entry for all inventories and it 
should not be treated as an after thought.  
Tables 4, shows that the distribution of the response elements was normal 
except for variables (e) and (g).  The quality of acquisition personnel and duration 
of supply contract revealed substantial abnormality.  As far as variable (e) is 
                                            
110 See Burt et al. 2003. World Supply Management SM- The Key to Supply Chain 
Management. 7th Edition. McGraw-Hill Irwin. Boston. 
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concerned, the most logical conclusion to be derived out of this is that, there is a 
lack of value standards towards professionalization of the acquisition workforce 
in the BDF.  Professionalization could be done through training and subsequent 
work experience as already realized in the past chapters.  Any method that 
debases this process opens the flood gates for shoddy outputs.  Position holders 
with other than proper purchasing interests, could then abuse acquisition for 
personal gain.  Variable (g) may have been influenced by the lack of grounds for 
comparison – BDF has always used short term contracting.  That is respected 
and forgiven herewith.    
It is cause for conjecture that only three senior officers responded.  Also 
there is no response from the acquisition workforce.  This is disheartening 
because any improvement not supported by top management, is bound to fail. In 
a world pervaded by scarcity and choice proper control mechanisms should be 
designed and enforced at a high level111. Further to that there has to be an 
interest from the acquisition workforce to seek better ways of service delivery112.  
The US DoD has had a go at improvement many times in the past and is still 
continuing.  Congress has passed many legislation pieces to upgrade standards 
to ever higher levels:  examples of which include the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996113.  The US military 
is undergoing continuous soul searching but even they experience acquisition 
scandals almost each decade114.  This is even the more reason to believe that 
acquisition decision making has to be elevated to high decision making levels.  




                                            
111 See Lieberman and Hall.  1999. Introduction to Economics. 1st Edition. South-Western 
College Publishing. Mason, Ohio. 
112 See  Sylvester and Ferrara’s discussion of EA above:  footnote 66. 
113 See  Sylvester and Ferrara’s discussion of legislative reforms: footnote 66. 
     114 See Nicholas Mavroules. “Creating a Professional Acquisition Workforce”. National 
Contract Management Journal; 1991; 24, 2; ABI/INFORM Global. 
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2. Structural Proposals 
It is the duty of any academic work to provide solutions for the exposed 
process failures.  This thesis, therefore, proposes the following defense 
acquisition structures for BDF, to ameliorate the maladies of the past.  This is in 
line with the exploratory study from the previous chapter, as well as the results of 
this thesis.  These suggestions are not necessarily offering a silver bullet.  They 
are suggested following the trend of established results of research, as 
proposals, not absolute solutions in themselves.  The underlying premise is that 
improvement of a process demands the continuous search for a better deal, as is 
the case with the US DoD.  Sitting in one’s laurels, has been overtaken by the 
times, in the era of knowledge working.  
 











Chief of Staff 





The above structure was designed closely following the practices of the 
other three defense organizations that were treated in Chapter II above.  It is the 
conviction of this thesis that when the acquisition command is separated from 
logistics command, then it would concentrate better on cultivation of best 
practices.   
The Logistics function of the BDF which currently heads the acquisition 
workforce cannot solve its own problems.  In this thesis, it is proposed that they 
should be the creators of the capability requirements.  The Logistics Commander 
should head the user requirement teams which this thesis shall call Capabilities 
Design Group (CDG) to come up with the CDF’s User Requirement Blueprint 
(URB), each year around July/August in preparation for the Botswana Budget 
Speech of February of the following year.  The URB will not be the final 
document for presentation to Parliament.  It will be meant as a proposal to assist 
the Defence Council in the programs that could finally be included in the Budget 
Speech.   
The head of acquisition should then become a staff officer for the 
Defence Council, and it is proposed that he should be a Major General to 
elevate purchasing to decision making level as current trends outlined in 
Chapter I and II above demand.  In tandem with the current naming of that 
level of office, he should be the Deputy Chief of Staff Defence Acquisition 
Command (DCOS DAC).  This officer should have the authority to 
streamline programs in the URB, in line with running programs and the 
strategic plan for the BDF’s mission satisfaction.  He would add the 
lacking detailed pecuniary analysis to acquisition.  The officer must then 
suggest his modifications or acceptance of the URB at the Defence 
Council meeting by October/November.  The Defence Council 
chairperson, who should be the Cabinet Minister responsible for defense, 
should present the final document to the President as a Proposed 
Defense Budget (PDB).   
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What does the above proposed process achieve for the equipment user?  
It will provide the user with an ability to design their needs assessments without a 
view to the inside information on the availability of funds, which seems 
inextricable from political filibuster all over the world.  With this method, the real 
needs will come out at the initial stages.  These will not be controlled by the 
already appropriated funds as is the case now.  It will therefore be the duty of the 
Defence Council to find the money for user needs satisfaction.   
Structurally the Defence Council is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is 
suggested in passing, that this should be people with a high level of expertise in 
defense and management. That arrangement will follow the UK MOD.  This will 
elevate decision making for defense expenditure to the elected legislators, when 
the budget is debated – an arrangement of the US DoD.  The Cabinet minister 
will then be compelled to defend the budget for defense and not the user who in 
this case is the CDF.  Further to this, it will demand professionalization of the 
Defence Acquisition Command (DAC) and elevate the heads of directorates 
within the command to a senior enough level to have garnered substantial 
experience and skills to navigate defense budgeting contours.  
The proposed detailed structure for the office of the proposed DCOS DAC 
is given next.  This also follows Chapter II’s exploratory study in view to 
improving the user satisfaction levels, analyzed above.  The structures used by 
the three defense organizations treated have an element of the functional 




Figure15. Proposed Detailed Structure of the DCOS DAC 
  
Starting from the bottom of Figure 15, the Specialist Program should be in 
touch with the detailed programs given to them by their directors.  They should 
be required to conduct regular reporting to the directors supervising them.  This 
will help in improving data quality and some level of specialization in acquisition.  
Solutions for problems would then become faster and easier.  The scientists and 
engineers would assist in shortening the search for solutions for the requirements 

































what is available in the international defense market.  Further to that they will 
advise on proposed changes to the design of particular equipment to suit the 
Botswana environment.  The input of all the directors will make up the contents of 
the PDB suggested above.  This will be refined as the DCOS DAC makes 
changes and additions until it becomes presentable to the Defence Council. 
There is also the suggested position of the Chief Financial Officer.  This 
officer should be made responsible for funds management for reprogramming 
and investment appraisals for new programs to be included in the PDB. 
3. Acquisition Process Flow Proposals 
There is need for a process in order for the systems model, suggested by 
John Dillard (2003) and other sources referenced in Chapter II, to produce 
outputs and their attendant outcomes.  To shun clear process design can only 
lead to trial and error with its concomitant corruption-potential.  The following 
process flow is therefore suggested.  
As noted earlier the CDF must be made responsible for designing a 
capabilities document for purposes of bringing the user needs of the soldier to 
the fore.  This document, herein called the URB, should be done with the DCOS 
DLC as its head.  Users from the different user units of the BDF and the 
maintenance officers should form a Capabilities Design Group (CDG).  They 
would then send this for review to the DCOS DLC, who would pass on the final 
version he approved to the CDF.    
The final URB will then go the Ministry of Defence to be handled by the 
DCOS DAC for analysis before any decision is taken on it.  This would require 
that the DCOS DAC should necessarily send this to the Chief of Acquisition and 
Contracting, who would analyze the suggested programs and assign preliminary 
project teams – members of who should include user provided personnel.  These 
are referred to herein, as Integrated Project Teams (IPT) for ease of reference. 
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO), will be brought in with his staff to do the 
financial analysis part.  The results from the IPTs and CFO would constitute a 
preliminary PDB.  Once the PDB has been finalized by the Minister it would be 
 65 
called a Defence Budget Memorandum (DBM), the final version of which would 
be signed by the Minister, for final presentation to the President.  Once the DBM 
is approved at that level it would be finalized into a Defence Budget Decision 
(DBD) also signed by the Minister of Defence and included as such in the 
government budget.  This is the document whose contents the Minister would 
defend in Parliament.   
Once Parliament enacts an Appropriation Act on defense then programs 
would start.  At this stage the Chief of Acquisition and Contracting (CAC) should 
send out proposal solicitations for major equipment (over BWP 100 million) and 
invitations to tender (ITT) for smaller purchases. These proposals and ITTs, 
would be received by the PPADB and not the DCOS DAC.  The ITTs for sealed 
bidding would have an opening and award date.  On the other hand proposals 
requiring negotiations would be registered by the PPADB and collected for 
further short listing and negotiation by the CAC. It is proposed that all major 
purchases should be negotiated and the minor purchases (BWP 100,000 to 100 
million) can then go for sealed bidding.  It is easy to design detailed technical 
specifications for small purchases since they are less complicated.   
Major purchases must follow a performance based approach and be 
negotiated.  The assigned program managers would form Contract Design 
Teams (CDT) to design and negotiate the specific contracts until they are signed 
by the DCOS DAC.  At this stage there will be no requirement for the Minister to 
intervene, unless when there is a contract protest which should be handled by 
his/her office.  All contracts would be signed by the DCOS DAC.  This suggestion 
does not include the authorization of the expenditures for small purchases by 
field acquisition officers who should be allowed to negotiate and sign for 





Figure16. Summary of Proposed Acquisition Process 
 
4. Total Obligation Authority 
There is abnormality of responses for the questions requiring rating of 
satisfaction with the duration of supply contract.  Perhaps this is because there 
are no grounds for comparison for the respondents.  Only one year contracting 
methods have been used in the BDF.  However it is proposed here that 
acquisition should not be reduced to a twelve months expenditure of obligations.  
In order to develop a defense capability, programs have to be deliberately and 
thoroughly evaluated.  The BDF must begin to have what McCaffery and Jones 
(2004) referenced above call Total Obligation Authority.  Programs must be 
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started with the total cost of ownership taken into account.  This should include 
operations and maintenance funds to be spent per year budgeted for at the 
program initiation stage.  No funds allocated for equipment programs should 
revert to government coffers before expiration of program timeframes.  
Reprogramming would then be done each year to adjust for cost under- or over-
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONLCUSIONS 
1. Summary of Results 
It turns out from the null hypothesis, that there can be some ways to deal 
with equipment downtime in the BDF.  The null hypothesis is proven to be true.  
The results show substantial dissatisfaction with the procurement methods of the 
BDF.  If the results from the questionnaire indicated that there was substantial 
satisfaction with the acquisition methods practiced in the BDF then the alternative 
hypothesis would have been proven instead, i.e., that there was nothing that 
could be done in acquisition to change the poor performance of inventory in the 
BDF.  There were seventy two responses and since this is higher than thirty, this 
assumes normality.  Further analysis, using Chi Squared Test for normality; 
buttresses the preliminary cursory conclusion.  The results were proven to be 
normal for the most part except variable (e) and (g).  This means that the results 
of the thesis can be trusted that they are from a normal source. 
The first issue that follows from the response to the questionnaire is that 
there is no support for acquisition development from top managers.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that only three senior officers responded to the 
questionnaire as appears in Table 3.1 above.  This creates a difficulty in that 
decision making is done at a high level – otherwise a good idea may not see the 
light of day.  There is a clear requirement for the organization leaders to 
recognize the need for process change.  Greenberg (2002)115, on pages 370 to 
375, teaches that when organizations realize that there is need to change then 
the leadership must come up with a new strategic plan.  It has to be important to 
the leadership to agree with what their juniors are saying about the organization. 
The second issue is the non-response of acquisition personnel.  If these 
individuals manning the key positions involved with spending government money 
                                            
115 Greenberg, Jerald.  2002.  Managing Behavior in Organizations. 3rd Edition. Prentice Hall. 
Upper Saddle River. Page 370 - 375. 
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would not be interested in a questionnaire that assesses their work area, then 
one wonders about their commitment to their jobs. 
2. Structural and Process Contributions to Downtime 
Unlike the other three defense departments compared in Chapter II, the 
BDF confines all the defense procurement processes within itself.  Also 
acquisition is a part of Logistics in the BDF.  This thesis concludes that all 
interested parties, to include the Defence Council and Parliament should have a 
stake in defense acquisition.  Logistics Command must be a user of the services 
offered by the acquisition workforce.  It is only in the case of separating the 
Logistics and Acquisition, that there can be a possibility of professionalizing 
acquisition.  This professionalization is demanded by the PPADB and supported 
by this thesis.  Further to that there would also be a possibility to fully staff the 
acquisition workforce, so that they could perform all the duties of coordinating 
and management.  These include trials and evaluation; supplier assessments; 
contract design; program management; market research, etc.  It is this 
insufficiency of the structure that leads to improper purchases. 
The analysis of data for this research revealed that the officers are not 
satisfied with the trials and evaluation processes.  It is concluded therefore, that 
not all the necessary steps are taken to assure the user of enhanced capability 
before the equipment is actually bought.  This is important even when the BDF is 
only buying equipment at the non developmental stage (NDI)116.  The equipment 
has to be tested under normal operating conditions before being purchased.  In 
this case the problems inherent in the design will be revealed in the specific 
conditions that the BDF operates in.  Defense equipment expenditure is large 
and must be done decidedly.  On the basis of the results obtained and 
exploratory research, it is concluded that the BDF needs to improve on the area 
of trials and evaluation.  It will be a good idea to be sure of performance before 
purchases are done. 
                                            
116 Anonymous. 2001. Test and Evaluation Management Guide. Defense Acquisition 
University Press. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Pages 11-2 to 11-3. 
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It is also concluded here that deliveries lead time can be brought to 
controllable levels by giving sufficient time to assess the equipment to be bought.  
It is not proper to decide to buy equipment without trials and evaluation.  
Acquisition personnel must also carry out market survey to establish the best 
ways of satisfying a need.  Only when these are done, in consultation with the 
suppliers concerned should the order to buy be placed.  In this case it will 
shorten the deliveries lead time.  The sooner the purchased item can be brought 
into service after an order the better for operations.  The users will have a shorter 
waiting time for their equipment. 
There is too much variety in the BDF.  This, as shown above, leads to 
higher logistics costs117.  The lack of funds will complicate this further as the 
spare parts become more expensive, due to variety.  This contributes to 
downtime.  It is concluded also that since the respondents to the questionnaire 
showed dissatisfaction with the variety of equipment introduced through 
acquisition, then the variety has to be reduced.  It does not lead to better 
capability when the same purpose equipment is brought in various versions – it 
only brings about higher maintenance costs.  This further leads to downtime as 
the ability to maintain equipment becomes more difficult than when there is one 
specialized supply.  
The BDF lacks asset visibility. There is no inventory management IT 
system.  Records on logistics metrics are done manually, if at all.  This becomes 
difficult to assess the performance of the equipment already in inventory118.  The 
respondents showed that they are unhappy in this aspect.  The problem directly 
impinges on acquisition.  Procurement of equipment requires that there should 
be knowledge of the lack of performance of the assets that are already in the 
armories, prior to a new needs assessment.  Asset visibility eliminates the 
tendency to buy even when the current inventory is still performing.  But in the 
                                            
117 Kang, Keebom. 1998. “DoD Inventory Management Cultural Changes and Training in 
Commercial Practices”. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
118 Ibid. 
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light of the downtime, the lack of IT means that not sufficient measures of 
capability evaluation can be performed.   
Another weakness in the structure and processes is the fact that the 
acquisition workforce does not have a clear career path.  Without proper training 
and education there can not be a development of the expertise.  Experience in 
the office goes only as high as the individuals’ exposure to extant knowledge.  
The design and implementation of these requirements will compel the BDF to 
staff all acquisition positions with the right personnel.  All disciplines need a 
career path.  For instance the BDF does not perceive of an infantry officer who 
does not go through continuous training.  The question is, why should it be less 
important for those who support the infantry to have the same level of 
recognition?  Clearly without good support the infantry can not succeed in an 
operation without properly procured equipment.  This proper procurement can be 
done with the right minds put together.  It is also concluded, that the acquisition 
head, has to be elevated to the higher position of say, Major General.  This will 
equate the rank to that of other service decision making like the DCOS DLC.  
This officer should then report to the Defence Council.  This shortens 
procurement decision making.  It further ensures that the user’s demands have 
an independent assessor.  It will compel the office of acquisition to work within 
limitations set by the legislated BDF mission and the defense capability set by 
the Defence Council.  
Mere preference for local suppliers is discouraged in defense 
procurement, albeit the fact that it is inculcated in the PPADB Act.  Clearly from 
the results there is abnormality in the responses for the variable dealing with the 
citizen supplier preference.  This may have been caused by the conflict between 
nationalist interests and the desire to arm the defense force.  The BDF has to be 
considered differently from the other departments of government where their 
suppliers can manufacture locally or at least get their manufacturers based in 
South Africa.  In that case the BDF can be assured that there is a stable supply 
chain.  The agents, who represent foreign companies in defense sales, are only 
appointed on a short term basis by their principals.  This creates a complication 
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in that the agent is not wholly a business stakeholder.  His/her interest is to sell 
for the sake of the commission that they get after selling.  Further to that there is 
little benefit to the economy because the agencies do not employ a lot of people 
for the purposes of doing agency work.  The supplier could continue or disappear 
from the market regardless of whether they keep the same agent or not. 
This thesis demands that there should be Total Obligation Authority119.  
The defense budget must not be based on a year to year basis.  There should be 
multi year contracting.  It creates some motivation to the supplier when they can 
be sure of future business.  They would be encouraged to produce good quality.  
It also would save the BDF a lot of time in carrying out new evaluations each 
year. 
The logistics metrics of reliability, availability and maintainability are also 
at unsatisfactory levels.  These can always be traced back to procurement.  
When the test/trials and evaluation at all levels for equipment are insufficiently 
done, it is bound to lead to unsatisfactory logistics metrics.  These can be 
bought.  The level of each could be inculcated in the modification of the NDI, 
when he BDF chooses to buy in the first place. 
The formation of PPADB is a good start towards professionalizing 
acquisition in government.  The responses showed abnormality in Table 3.2, in 
relation to the PPADB relations with BDF.  It is understandable in the light of the 
fact that this is a new body.  But with time as acquisition continues to be staffed 
with experts in the field then there will be conviction to the need for the demands 
of this body. 
The turnaround time has been shown to be unsatisfactory for the 
respondents.  This is what this thesis expected.  It is thus concluded that 
acquisition has not helped the situation very much. 
                                            
119 See Jerry L McCaffery and L R Jones. 2004. Budgeting and Financial Management for 
National Defense: A volume in research in public management. Information Age Publishing. page 
370. 
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The need to begin to involve the Defence Council in procurement can not 
be overemphasized.  A defense bureaucracy proposed by Thaga (2004)120, is 
required in this thesis.  The Minister responsible for defense should then be in a 
position to defend the defense budget in parliament among legislators.  This will 
determine how much funding the country can afford for military equipment.  The 
Defense Council should propose and maintain procurement standards for the 
BDF.  The CDF will then be in a position to bring his user needs without being 
given the responsibility to deal with budget limitations as well.  Further to that the 
holders of the purse strings will be compelled through this bureaucracy to set and 
permit a national level of defense through appropriations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following is the list of resultant recommendations from this research:  
1. This thesis recommends that the BDF should attempt to adopt the 
structural and process proposals given in Chapter III above.   
2. There should be thorough trials and evaluation for all the equipment that 
may be bought for the BDF. 
3. The head of acquisition should be elevated to command level to assist 
decision making121. 
4. There must be a career path for acquisition personnel122. 
5. The BDF must introduce asset visibility through the implementation of 
IT123. 
6. In line with the above recommendation, the BDF must enforce collection of 
logistics metrics. 
7. Preference for suppliers should be based on best value for money, not 
merely on citizenship.                                             
120 Thaga, Laki S. March 2004. “Unpacking and Rearranging the Boxes”: The Search for 
New Institutional Matrix of Democratic Control of the Military in Botswana. Thesis for the Master 
of Arts in Security Studies at Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, Carlifornia. USA. 
121 Ibid, footnote 7. 
122 Ibid, footnote 24. 
123 Ibid, footnote 95. 
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8. Total Obligation Authority must be studied, with a view to implement it in 
the BDF124. 
9. Further to that, further research is recommended in the light of the 
weakness of the resultant model in Chapter III.  This research should find 
out whether empirical data for sampled equipment, shows that there is 
actually a low A0.  This thesis was using nominal data and the proposed 
further research would use interval data. 
                                            
124 See Jerry L McCaffery and L R Jones. 2004. Budgeting and Financial Management for 
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